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ABSTRACT:  Paul Boghossian has argued that de re ascriptions of mental content are unfit for 
assessments of rationality.
1
  An individual, he suggests, can comport with the principles of logic 
and rationality if and only if she is able to introspectively recognize the content of her thoughts 
and beliefs without relying on empirical evidence.  Jessica Brown argues, first, that Boghossian’s 
notion of rationality is unrealistic and incompatible with modern experimental data, and second, 
that his principles of transparency of mental content are unreasonable and, ultimately, self-
defeating.
2
  In defending Boghossian’s notion of rationality, and subsequently his transparency 
principles, this paper attempts to respond to Brown’s arguments by distinguishing between two 
notions of rationality (weak and strong) and between two aspects of mental content 
(psychological and social).  Acknowledging the weak notion of rationality will preserve the 
ordinary conception of typical subjects as rational beings, while introducing the distinction 
between psychological content and social content resolves the contradiction between the 
principles of transparency in Mates case circumstances. 
Introduction 
In a chapter of her recent book, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown 
responds to the criticism, put forth by Paul Boghossian, that anti-individualism is incompatible 
with our ordinary concept of rationality.
 
Boghossian’s criticism is that, since anti-individualism 
denies epistemic transparency of mental content, it undermines an otherwise rational subject’s 
ability to behave rationally (i.e., denying transparency disposes agents to holding contradictory 
beliefs and/or making invalid inferences).  Boghossian argues that any theory of mental content, 
if it is to comport with even a minimal notion of rationality, must conform to the following two 
principles: 
                                                 
1
 Boghossian, (1994). 
2
 Brown, (2004). 
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Transparency of sameness of content:  If two of a thinker’s token thoughts possess the 
same content, then the thinker must be able to know a priori that they do 
Transparency of difference of content: If two of a thinker’s token thoughts 
possess distinct contents, then the thinker must be able to know a priori that they 
do.
 3
 
 
Brown, however, argues that the notion of rationality espoused by Boghossian is 
unrealistically demanding and inconsistent with the behavior displayed by subjects in recent 
psychological experiments.  Moreover, she argues that Boghossian’s principles of transparency 
fail regardless of the truth of anti-individualism, that there are situations in which the principles 
of epistemic transparency of mental content are self-defeating.  Thus, she says, it cannot be an 
objection against anti-individualism that it undermines the transparency of a subject’s mental 
content and, thereby, Boghossian’s notion of rationality.  This paper examines and responds to 
both arguments, first by pointing to an alternate notion of rationality also espoused by 
Boghossian—one that is perfectly consistent with the psychological data.  Second, it attempts to 
show how, even in the special circumstances described by Brown, transparency of mental 
content can be preserved by distinguishing between the psychological content of thought and the 
social content of an expression.  Since it is important to understand the background criticisms to 
which Brown is responding before presenting her arguments against Boghossian, the following 
section presents the thought-experimental intuitions that motivate Boghossian’s principles of 
transparency.   
1.  Anti-Individualism and Irrationality 
Boghossian argues that an anti-individualist conception of content undermines our 
ordinary conception of rationality, because it precludes a subject’s a priori ability to make simple 
valid inferences, to avoid holding contradictory beliefs, and to avoid making invalid inferences.  
                                                 
3
 Cf. Boghossian, p. 42. 
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Without epistemic transparency of mental content, he says, “our conceptions of rationality and of 
rational explanation yield absurd results.”
4
  For each principle of transparency there is a 
paradigm thought experiment
5
 meant to show how rejecting a priori access to mental content 
prevents a subject from acting in a way that can be deemed rational.  First, I present a thought 
experiment provided by Brian Loar, meant to elucidate the need for transparency of sameness of 
content; second, to support the need for transparency of difference of content, I will describe a 
situation that arises from Hilary Putnam’s famous “Twin Earth” thought experiment. 
1.1 Sameness of Content 
 In support of the idea that rational behavior requires the transparency of sameness of 
content, consider the following example from Loar: 
Suppose that Paul, an English speaker, has been raised by a French nanny in a 
sheltered way.  She speaks English with Paul, but amuses herself by referring to 
the cats around them as “chats” (she says “shahs,” pronouncing the “s”) and never 
as “cats.”  Paul acquires thereby a perfectly good recognitional acquaintance with 
cats and many beliefs about them, but he does not know that in English they are 
properly called “cats.”  Suppose he forms the belief he would express as “All 
chats have tails”; it seems [by an anti-individualist description of his mental 
content] we are then justified in asserting the Paul believes all cats have tails… As 
it happens, he occasionally sees his parents, who speak of animals called “cats.”  
Because no cats are ever present, nor any pictures of cats, Paul does not realize 
that cats are his familiar “chats.”  Now Paul’s parents tell him various things 
about cats, in particular that they all have tails.  On this basis it is again true of 
Paul that he believes that all cats have tails.
6
 
 
If we take an anti-individualist position we have to admit that Paul can come to hold two beliefs 
with the same content, namely that cats have tails.  But, as both Boghossian and Loar point out, 
“intuitively…it is quite clear that Paul will not be able to tell a priori that the belief he expresses 
                                                 
4
 Boghossian, p. 39. 
5
 That is to say, there is at least but not only one thought experiment utilized for the purpose of demonstrating that 
lack of transparency entails lack of rationality. 
6
 Loar, (1988), p. 184. 
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with ‘All chats have tails’ is the same belief that he expresses with ‘All cats have tails’.”
7
  This 
example clearly illustrates how anti-individualism interferes with the transparency of sameness 
of mental content. 
From this interference with transparency, Boghossian contends, we can see how anti-
individualism potentially leads to irrationality, since Paul, lacking a priori access to his thoughts, 
becomes vulnerable to holding beliefs with contradictory content.  If, for instance, Paul’s parents 
talked all and only about Manx cats, then one of the various facts that he would have learned 
about “cats” is that some of them do not have tails.  From this it would follow that Paul believes 
both “Some cats do not have tails” and (from the nanny’s lessons about all “chats” having tails) 
“All cats have tails.”  But these two beliefs are blatantly contradictory.  Thus, if the contents of 
his thoughts are determined externally, Paul will unwittingly hold beliefs with contradictory 
content. 
Both Boghossian and Loar appeal to our intuitions in utilizing this thought experiment.  It 
seems intuitive, they say, that Paul has distinct concepts with distinct content, since his beliefs 
about “chats” serve different mental functions and interact with other beliefs in markedly 
different ways than his beliefs about “cats.”  Since they serve different mental functions and 
interact in different ways with other beliefs, it seems natural to say that Paul’s content expressed 
by “chats” is different than his content expressed by “cats.”  Paul’s parents may very well have 
instilled in him the axiom “never bring a cat to school,” but it is intuitively difficult to accuse 
Paul of being either disobedient or irrational for bringing his favorite “chat” to show-and-tell.  
All of these intuitions, though, would likely change if we understood Paul as recognizing that his 
beliefs about “cats” and “chats” had identical content.  That is, it seems that we can only fairly 
                                                 
7
 Boghossian, p. 37. 
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assess Paul’s rationality if the identical content of his beliefs is available to him upon 
introspection, which just is the principle of sameness of mental content.
8
 
1.2 Difference of Content 
 Boghossian also points to instances in which irrationality follows from the fact that “two 
tokens of a thinker’s language of thought belonging to the same syntactic type have distinct 
meanings, but the thinker is [under an anti-individualist interpretation] not in a position to know 
a priori that they do.”
9
  Such instances arise when we consider what he calls ‘one-world 
traveling cases.’  Hilary Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought experiment is supposed to illustrate the 
necessity of individuating mental contents by the external objects to which they refer.
10
  As one 
version of the story goes,  
There is a world, call it “Twin Earth,” which is identical to this world in every 
way save one: on Twin Earth, the stuff in rivers and lakes and faucets is 
composed of a substance superficially indistinguishable from water, but with 
chemical structure XYZ instead of H2O.  Without consent or knowledge, the story 
continues, an earthling named Oscar is seamlessly transported to Twin Earth (in 
his sleep, perhaps), where he forms beliefs and utters propositions about the stuff 
in twin lakes, twin rivers, and twin faucets.  Anti-individualism suggests that, 
since there is no H2O in Oscar’s environment, ‘water’ now picks out instances of 
XYZ, since his environment individuates the content of Oscar’s beliefs and 
utterances.
 11
  Oscar, by most accounts (including Brown’s), also uses ‘water’ to 
talk and think about aquatic interactions that occurred on Earth, instances of 
interactions with H2O.  According to most versions of anti-individualism, then, 
                                                 
8
 In an earlier chapter, Brown argues that her version of anti-individualism, unlike other popular versions, can 
successfully accommodate the principle of transparency of sameness of content by utilizing a ‘Fregean sense,’ in 
which sense is understood as “a way of thinking about an object that would not be available in the absence of the 
object.” (Brown, p. 21)  Paul may think about cats via a ‘chats’ sense, and he may think about cats via a ‘cats’ sense; 
since these are two different ways of thinking about cats, they are two different senses with two different contents.  
Thus, utilizing her ‘Fregean anti-individualism,’ Brown believes she can avoid attributing logically contradictory 
beliefs to Paul, as well as any other cases of identical referential content.  My suspicion is that this position appears 
more like a two-factor or dual-content theory (one part ‘object’, one part ‘way of thinking about object’) than a 
purely anti-individualist position.  I do not, however, pursue this suspicion any further here. 
9
 Boghossian, p. 37. 
10
 Cf., Putnam (1975).  
11
 Some anti-individualists hold that the change in reference of ‘water’ occurs immediately; others who hold that the 
change occurs only after a suitable amount of time; still others who hold that ‘water’ comes to possess a composite 
meaning, picking out both H2O and XYZ.  Brown, however, dismisses the last theory as one that “would not be 
accepted by many anti-individualists” and concludes that most anti-individualists “accept that, as a result of a slow 
switch, a subject may have two concepts that she expresses by a single term.” (Brown, p. 185). 
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Oscar has two indistinguishable concepts: one (‘water’) that picks out H2O and 
another (‘twater’) that picks out XYZ.  However, Oscar is ignorant of which 
concept he has in mind when thinking about water. 
 
According to Boghossian, this inability to distinguish between the content of his thoughts 
could lead Oscar to behave irrationally, since it opens him up to the possibility of making invalid 
inferences.  Oscar may have formed a general belief rooted in an Earthly experience that looks 
something like “water quenches my thirst,” whose content is ‘water.’  After a particularly 
grueling workout on Twin Earth, Oscar eyes a bottle of ‘twater’ and concludes (based on his 
general belief about ‘water’), “This will quench my thirst.”  Under the anti-individualist 
description of things, the ‘water’ content of his general belief differs from the ‘water’ content of 
the particular bottle.  Thus, Oscar’s inference to the conclusion that the bottle of ‘twater’ will 
quench his thirst is invalid, though he sees it as a perfectly valid inference.  The invalidity of the 
inference (and thus, Oscar’s irrationality), Boghossian says, is inevitable so long as the content 
of Oscar’s concepts remains unavailable to introspection.  That is, Oscar is irrational because he 
lacks transparency of mental content. 
These two thought experiments are meant to convey the counter-intuitive consequences 
of an anti-individualist semantic theory.  A brief sketch of Boghossian’s argument looks 
something like this:  
1. Being rational is a matter of making valid inferences and avoiding contradictions.  
2. In order to make valid inferences and avoid contradictions, subjects must have a priori, 
introspective access to the content of their thoughts.  
3. If we assume an anti-individualist semantics, then subjects do not have a priori, 
introspective access to their thoughts (as demonstrated by the Paul and Oscar).  
4. Thus, if we assume an anti-individualist semantics, subjects are not rational. 
 
Brown denies both Boghossian’s notion of rationality (1) and his belief that anti-
individualism is to blame for subjects failing to have a priori, introspective access to the content 
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of their thoughts (3).  The following section presents and, in turn, responds to these two 
arguments. 
2.  Challenging Boghossian 
 Brown says that her proposal to reject Boghossian’s notion of rationality “is also 
motivated by considerations that are independent of the truth of anti-individualism.  There is 
much evidence that subjects do not always conform their thoughts to the laws of logic a priori.”
12
  
She gives two counter-examples to support her claim that transparency, when combined with 
Boghossian’s notion of rationality, fails independently of the veracity of any particular semantic 
theory.  First, she argues that subjects in psychological experiments typically fail to display the 
kind of rationality described by Boghossian, even in circumstances where transparency of mental 
content is not involved or required.  Second, she points to certain situations—namely, what she 
calls Mates cases—in which transparency of mental content unavoidably fails, whether we 
assume an anti-individualist position or not.  I want to reply to her first argument by calling 
attention to a second notion of rationality, a weaker notion (entertained by Boghossian, but not 
mentioned by Brown), which might be capable of dealing with the problematic experimental 
data.  In response to the second counter-example, I attempt to demonstrate that, even in the 
Mates cases described by Brown, transparency can be maintained. 
2.1 Wason’s Selection Task 
Brown begins her argument against Boghossian’s notion of rationality with the 
observation that “subjects sometimes make mistakes in their reasoning, or have inconsistent 
beliefs, when only a little logical acumen is required to reveal the mistake.”
13
  The failure to 
avoid or notice such inconsistencies is commonplace, she says, even among highly intelligent 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., p. 185. 
13
 Ibid., p. 185. 
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and educated persons.  Take, for instance, the regularity of less than logical behavior displayed 
by typically rational subjects in Wason’s selection task: 
Subjects are presented with four cards, each with only one side visible; they show 
‘A’, ‘K’, ‘4’, and ‘7’ respectively.  Subjects are asked which cards they need to 
turn over in order to test the truth of the rule: ‘If a card has a vowel on one side, 
then it has an even number on the other.’  
 
Most subjects respond, quite correctly, that the ‘A’ card needs to be turned over, but the 
surprising and relevant discovery that Wason (and numerous subsequent experimenters) made 
was that many subjects also respond, quite incorrectly, that the ‘4’ card also needs to be turned 
over.  The appropriate method of testing the rule’s validity would be to turn over the ‘7’ card, as 
its possessing a vowel would demonstrate a failure of the rule.  Brown argues that this 
experiment illustrates that the vast majority of subjects seem neither able nor disposed to 
conform to the laws of logic a priori, contrary to Boghossian’s claims about rationality.  A priori 
conformity to the laws of logic is just the kind of rationality that the principles of transparency 
are designed to ensure, but this kind of rationality seems to be more than what most people are 
capable of.  If a priori conformity to the laws of logic is beyond the range of typical human 
cognition, then, Brown argues, any notion of rationality that requires such conformity is 
unrealistic and should be dismissed.   
It is not especially controversial to interpret the participants in the selection task as failing 
to behave as if they were disposed to adhere to the laws of logic, a priori or otherwise.  If this 
disposition were essential to Boghossian’s notion of rationality, then Wason’s evidence would 
surely be sufficient to undermine it.  It would follow, as Brown argues, that any principles 
governing propositional content aimed at maintaining such a notion of rationality would be 
unrealistically demanding.  It would then follow that, if the principles governing propositional 
content were unrealistic in their demands, then it couldn’t possibly be an argument against anti-
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individualism that it fails to comport with those principles.  In the next section, I will point to a 
second notion of rationality mentioned in Boghossian’s paper, a notion that does not seem to 
conflict with the data from selection task experiments.   
2.2 Weak versus Strong Rationality 
If we take Brown at face value, then it seems that Boghossian’s notion of rationality is 
overly demanding and unrealistic in its constraints.  There are, however, two notions of 
rationality that Boghossian depicts in setting the stage for the principles of transparency of 
content: one I refer to as weak rationality, the other as strong rationality.  Though I suspect both 
of them are equally consistent with the principles of transparency, they are not equally resilient 
to the charges set forth in regard to the selection task—namely, that Boghossian’s rationality 
conflicts with the behavior displayed in numerous psychological experiments.  Brown’s 
argument that Boghossian’s rationality is inconsistent with experimental data turns on what 
should be seen as strong rationality, which is suggested by the following passage: 
What does a person have to do to count as a good reasoner?  Clearly, it is not at 
all a question of knowing empirical facts, of having lots of justified true beliefs 
about the external world.  Rather, it is a matter of being able, and of being 
disposed, to make one’s thoughts conform to the principles of logic on an a priori 
basis.
14
[my emphasis] 
 
However, we need not understand Boghossian as endorsing only strong rationality.  In 
fact, I take him to be equally committed to a significantly weaker notion of rationality, wherein 
an agent is rational insofar as she is able, given sufficient opportunity to reflect on the matter, to 
avoid obvious violations of the laws of logic.  In a portion of the paragraph quoted by Brown (in 
which she utilizes ellipsis to omit the weaker claim from the block quoted in her book), 
Boghossian admits: 
                                                 
14
 Boghossian, p 42. 
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We may, if we wish, put the matters in a far less committal way: let’s say that 
being minimally rational is a matter of being able to avoid obvious violations of 
the principles of logic, given enough time to reflect on the matter and so on.
15
  
 
Under the strong notion of rationality, agents are not only able, they are disposed to 
conform to the laws of logic a priori, which suggests that humans, in general, tend to behave in 
ways that comport with the laws of logic.  This idea resembles what some social scientists call 
“hyperrationality,” which is the normative or idealized conception of humans as maximally 
rational agents and ideal decision makers.  Similarly, economic utility theory depicts humans as 
optimizing agents that generally make the most rational decision and maximize their welfare in 
any situation when given sufficient relevant information.
16
   
The weak notion of rationality, however, says only that humans are generally able to be 
rational, in that they have the ability to avoid obvious violations of logical principles.  The weak 
notion is much more consistent with today’s commonly accepted beliefs regarding human 
rationality, e.g., Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality.
17
  Bounded rationality is the idea 
that human rationality is limited by factors, such as emotions, superstitions, lack of time and 
memory space, etc.  The weak notion of rationality, like the notion of bounded rationality, admits 
that there are factors that limit the rationality of human behavior; however, it also claims that, 
given enough time and opportunity, agents can overcome those factors to determine whether 
their behavior conflicts with basic logical principles.  
                                                 
15
 Boghossian, p 42. 
16
 This model is sometimes taken as a normative description of the behavior humans should strive for: 
“Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and aims at 
showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, would be impelled, if 
that motive…were absolute ruler of all their actions.” [Mill (1836), p. 53]. 
On the other hand, it is sometimes used as a descriptive theory of rationality, useful for predicting human behavior: 
“[Positive Economics’] task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances.” [Friedman (1953), p. 4]. 
17
 Cf., Simon (1957). 
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Nothing in this weaker notion of rationality is prima facie inconsistent with the behavior 
displayed in the selection task.  Though subjects failed to utilize the ideal logical principles that 
would most fully test the truth of the experimental rule, since they do not seem to be acting in 
direct violation of any logical principles, they do not fail to be rational insofar as we utilize the 
weak notion of rationality.  As such, they appear to satisfy the conditions of rationality, if 
rationality consists in the weak rather than strong notion. 
All that can be said of the selection task participants is that they are not maximally 
rational agents (i.e., “hyperrational” optimizers), and that they fail to be rational only on the 
strong notion of rationality.  They do not appear to be relying on obviously contradictory lines of 
reasoning, so despite their general failure to reach ideally rational conclusions, they nonetheless 
qualify as rational beings on the weak notion.  It is essential, however, to Brown’s argument that 
the selection task participants act contrary to Boghossian’s notion of rationality.  If they do not 
fail to count as rational beings, then Boghossian’s principles of transparency cannot be charged 
with being based on an unrealistic notion of rationality.  Because Brown’s argument hinges on 
the strong notion of rationality, distinguishing between it and weak rationality preserves the both 
Boghossian’s notion of rationality and his principles of transparency.  The next section explores 
whether a similar distinction can rescue transparency from Brown’s second attack. 
2.3 Mates Cases 
The second argument against Boghossian is intended to show that, regardless of the truth 
of anti-individualism, there are situations in which the principles of transparency of content are 
self-defeating.  That is, there are times in which one rational individual’s ability to recognize a 
priori sameness (or difference) of thought content precludes another rational individual’s ability 
to recognize a priori difference (or sameness) of thought content.  If Brown can successfully 
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demonstrate that in at least some circumstances transparency fails regardless of the truth of anti-
individualism, she will rebut the objection to anti-individualism that it should be rejected to 
preserve epistemic transparency of mental content.   
Brown’s task, then, is to describe at least one situation in which a failure of transparency 
necessarily occurs, in which it is impossible for at least one person to have a priori access to the 
similarity or difference of her thought contents.  She thinks such a situation arises in certain 
instances, namely those instances that have come to be known as Mates cases.
18
  Take two 
sentences: 
(i) No one doubts that whoever believes that Mary is a physician believes that 
Mary is a physician. 
(ii) No one doubts that whoever believes that Mary is a physician believes that 
Mary is a doctor. 
 
There is some disagreement amongst philosophers as to whether  (i) and (ii) express the same 
proposition; that is, whether substituting ‘doctor’ for ‘physician’ in (ii) preserves the content in 
(i).  Mates himself argued that it is possible for someone to accept (i) yet doubt (ii); after all, (i) 
is an analytic truth that cannot fail to be true, while all that is necessary for (ii)’s veracity to fail 
is for one individual to doubt that whoever believes that Mary is a physician believes that Mary 
is a doctor.  Others claim that it is impossible to accept (i) yet deny (ii).
 19
   Brown utilizes this 
debate to attack transparency: 
This disagreement about whether the sentences (i) and (ii) express the same 
proposition can be used to argue that there is a pair of thoughts that each 
philosopher thinks although they disagree about whether these thoughts have the 
                                                 
18
 The Mates case was first presented in Benson Mates’ 1950 paper “Synonymity.” 
19
 The origin of the disagreement arose between Mates and Church on whether Carnap’s explication of synonymy as 
intentional isomorphism (Carnap argued that two words were synonymous if they could be substituted salve veritate 
in any sentence) was satisfactory.  Mates believed it to be obvious that (i) could be true while (ii) could be false, 
using this ‘obvious’ truth as a counter-example to Carnap.  Church (1954) argued against Mates that, since anyone 
who could be described as believing that Mary was a physician could also be described as believing that Mary was a 
doctor, (ii) also had to be true.   
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same or different content.
20
   
 
The argument develops into the following dilemma: either the two sentences express the same 
content or they express different content.  Since some believe that the two express identical 
content, while others believe that the two express different content, we inevitably encounter a 
failure of transparency.  If the two sentences express identical content, then those who believe 
they express different content are incapable of recognizing the sameness of content a priori; but 
if the two sentences express different content, then those who believe they express the same 
content are incapable of recognizing the difference of content a priori.  Whichever horn of the 
dilemma we grasp, we are left with a failure of transparency.  Importantly, Brown thinks this 
holds true regardless of the veracity of anti-individualism.  I do not think, however, that Brown 
sufficiently explored the viability of transparency in Mates cases under an individualist position.  
What follows is an attempt at just such an exploration. 
2.4 Psychological Content 
If the Mates case truly poses a problem for transparency of content regardless of the truth 
of anti-individualism, then transparency should fail even if we distinguish between the social 
usage of a term and the individual’s use of that term.  It may be that the content of thought and 
the content of linguistic expression are not identical to each other, that there can be a difference 
between the psychological content of a thought associated with a given expression and the social 
content of that expression in the public language.  I develop this possibility more fully below, but 
first allow me to explain the general structure of my argument.   
It might be obvious, already, how this exploration will proceed: describe the Mates case 
scenario in an individualist framework, and demonstrate that transparency doesn’t fail.  And it 
might seem that I am just guilty of begging the question and stacking the chips in my favor.  
                                                 
20
 Brown, p. 186. 
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Remember, though, that Brown was ostensibly demonstrating that transparency in Mates cases is 
self-defeating even if anti-individualism were not true, from which it would follow that failure of 
transparency cannot be an objection against anti-individualism.  Since, I suggest, her 
presentation of the Mates case was not sufficiently disentangled from anti-individualism, it falls 
to me to demonstrate that transparency in Mates cases is possible when we assume anti-
individualism is not true.  From this demonstration, it would then follow that transparency does 
not fail regardless of anti-individualism.  
If we can reasonably distinguish between psychological and social content, then Brown’s 
putative counter-example may not illustrate what it sets out to illustrate: namely that there are 
cases in which transparency is self-defeating.  If Brown’s counter-example is undermined, then 
Boghossian’s principles of transparency, and his corresponding notion of rationality, will retain 
their plausibility and will remain a problem for anti-individualism.  It is important, then, to see 
how the Mates case works when the content of thought (psychological content) is distinguished 
from the content of expression in public language (social content).  First, however, I need to 
clarify what I mean by psychological content and social content. 
Leaning heavily on Loar’s
21
 work, I take psychological content to be the way a person 
conceives of an object, sentence, term, etc.  Psychological content is individuated by the 
conceptual or cognitive role it plays in the individual’s psychology (i.e., how it interacts with and 
affect other beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, etc.).  In the case of Paul’s cats, “chats” plays a 
significantly different role in his belief-formations and attitudes about cats than that played by 
“cats.”  Most obviously, in the case where Paul’s parents spoke only of Manx cats, “chats” 
interacts directly with Paul’s beliefs about animals with tails, whereas “cats” does not.  “Chats” 
                                                 
21
 Op. cit. 
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falls within his mental category of ‘things I can take to show-and-tell’ while “cats” does not.  
These differences in conceptual/cognitive role, I suggest, entail different psychological contents.  
On the other hand, by social content I mean whatever is captured by that-clauses in 
descriptions of meaning.  These are the de re ascriptions which are important for capturing the 
references of thoughts.  As Loar suggests, “that-clauses capture how a belief would be expressed 
by exhibiting something that is equivalent in social content (as we might say) to what the subject 
would utter, given his deference to the usage of his linguistic community.”
22
  Whatever Paul’s 
“chats” thoughts and “cats” thoughts commonly refer to, that is the social content of Paul’s 
thoughts (namely, in this case, they both have as their extensions cats).  What follows is an 
implementation of the psychological content/social content distinction in regard to the Mates 
case.
23
 
In her discussion of the Mates case, Brown utilizes Kripke as representative of the set that 
believes (i) and (ii) express the same thought content, while she takes Burge to represent those 
who believe (i) and (ii) express different thought contents.  In the name of continuity, I will do 
the same.   
Supposing, then, that there is a purely psychological component of Kripke’s thought 
content, as well as a social content of the expression he would associate with that thought 
content, we have reason to deny that transparency is self-defeating.  That is, part of the thought 
Kripke expresses by uttering (i) is determined by the role it plays in his psychology and by how 
it interacts with other beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, etc.; likewise for Burge.  It is possible and, I 
think, quite likely that the psychological content Kripke might express by (i) is distinct from the 
psychological content Burge would express by (i); and it is equally possible that the 
                                                 
22
 Loar, p. 190. 
23
 How the two types of content are related (e.g., how they impact and effect one another) is not a matter I address in 
this paper.   
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psychological content Kripke might express by (ii) is not identical to the psychological content 
Burge would express by (ii).  However, if we consider psychological contents as being distinct 
from social contents, it would follow that two psychological contents associated with a single 
linguistic expression need not be identical to each other.  Rather than just the two social contents 
expressed by (i) and (ii)—in this case denoted by (i*) and (ii*)—there could be up to four 
psychological contents:  
(Ki*) the psychological content Kripke associates with (i),  
(Bi*) the psychological content Burge associates with (i),  
(Kii*) the psychological content Kripke associates with (ii), and  
(Bii*) the psychological content Burge associates with (ii). 
   
That is all to say that there could be as many as four unique conceptual/cognitive roles 
played by the concepts expressed in (i) and (ii).  I will call this the four-thought model, which I 
suggest de-fangs Brown’s argument and preserves the plausibility of the principles of 
transparency. 
Brown argued that either (i) and (ii) express the same content or they do not, and since 
Kripke and Burge disagree about just that, one of them will always lack transparency of content; 
that is, necessarily, one of them will be unable to realize a priori the sameness or difference of 
his thought content.  However, this argument operated on a limited conception of the content 
under consideration.  Once we distinguish between the psychological and social contents, we can 
see how both thinkers can maintain transparency.  Regardless of whether (i*) and (ii*) are 
identical social content, the psychological content Kripke and Burge associate with (i) and (ii) 
arguably can differ for each thinker and, just as importantly, between thinkers.  Within the 
framework of psychological content vs. social content, there is no reason to believe that the 
psychological content (Ki*) that Kripke associates with the public expression (i) need be 
identical to the psychological content (Bi*) that Burge associates with the public expression (i).  
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Similarly, the psychological content (Kii*) that Kripke associates with the public expression (ii) 
need not be identical to the psychological content (Bii*) that Burge associates with the public 
expression (ii).   
Also, whether (Ki*)=(Kii*) will be a function of the conceptual/cognitive role(s) each 
thought plays in Kripke’s psychology.  That is, they are identical only insofar as they interact in 
identical ways with identical beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, etc.  The converse holds true for 
(Bi*) and (Bii*): if they are different, they are so in virtue of interacting with different beliefs, 
attitudes, perceptions, etc.; or in virtue of interacting in different ways with the same beliefs, 
attitudes, perceptions, etc.  If we apply the principles of transparency strictly to the psychological 
contents of thought, then it is possible that both Kripke and Burge can have a priori introspective 
access to their own thoughts without defeating the other’s transparency. 
The Mates case challenges transparency if and only if it selectively considers just the 
social content of thought.  The argument against transparency is that, if (i*) and (ii*) are identical 
as Kripke thinks, then Burge lacks transparency of sameness, and if (i*) and (ii*) are different as 
Burge thinks, then Kripke lacks transparency of difference.  However, even if Kripke is “correct” 
and the social contents of (i) and (ii) were identical, it still does not follow that the psychological 
contents, (Bi*) and (Bii*), would have to be the same.  The principles of transparency, in the 
four-thought model, merely suggest that if the psychological contents of Kripke’s thoughts are 
identical then he can know so a priori.  Kripke need merely consider (Ki*) and (Kii*) to 
determine if they are the same.  That the social contents are identical, though, mandates nothing 
concerning the identity (or non-identity) between the psychological content of Burge’s thoughts.  
We can maintain Boghossian’s principle of transparency of sameness of content, but require only 
this: if (Ki*) and (Kii*) are identical then Kripke must be able to know a priori that they are. 
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If, on the other hand, Burge is “correct” and the social contents of (i) and (ii) were 
different, it would also not follow that the psychological contents, (Ki*) and (Kii*), would have 
to be different.  Neither the fact that Burge’s psychological contents are different nor the 
possibility that the social contents of (i) and (ii) are different would require anything of Kripke’s 
thought contents.  Boghossian’s principle of transparency of difference of content merely 
requires that Burge be able to know a priori that (Bi*) and (Bii*) are different.   
When Brown presented the Mates case, she described the disagreement between Burge 
and Kripke as a disagreement of whether (i) and (ii) expressed the same proposition.  Under 
Brown’s presupposition, this was simply a question of whether or not the contents of the two 
expressions were identical.  I have suggested that this description leads to failure of transparency 
because it does not distinguish between the psychological content of thoughts and the social 
content.  However, on the four-thought model, they can both be right (or wrong) without 
entailing anything about the other: Kripke can believe that (Ki*)=(Kii*), without contradicting 
Burge’s belief that (Bi*)≠(Bii*).  It remains, however, for me to show how we should understand 
the disagreement between Burge and Kripke under the four-thought model.   
The short answer is that neither Kripke nor Burge consider the psychological/social 
content distinction.  They are both anti-individualistic, in that they both deny that there is a 
content of thought wholly determined by a conceptual/cognitive role.  Thus their disagreement is 
a matter of whether or not the social contents of (i) and (ii) are identical.   
Conclusion 
Brown presented two arguments aimed at challenging the principles of epistemic 
transparency of mental content.  First, she argued that the rationality motivating the principles 
was an unrealistic notion of rationality that conflicted with empirical data from psychological 
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experiments.  Second, she attempted to show that, in certain situations, the principles of 
transparency were unavoidably self-defeating.  As such, she argued, we should reject 
transparency-based rationality both because subjects typically fail to demonstrate an ability to 
follow the laws of logic a priori and because, regardless of the truth of anti-individualism, 
Boghossian’s principles of transparency are potentially self-defeating.  I have argued in response 
that her counter-examples do not adequately demonstrate either that subjects are incapable of 
following the laws of logic a priori or that Boghossian’s principles of rationality necessarily fail 
in Mates cases.  I did so by first drawing attention to a useful distinction between strong 
rationality and weak rationality, and then by presenting an alternative understanding of the Mates 
case scenario.  This alternative understanding distinguishes between the psychological content of 
a thought and the social content.  In short, I have defended Boghossian’s principles of 
transparency, as well as his notion of rationality, from Brown’s attacks. 
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